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Alain Govaert* & Ming cao*
Many of today’s most pressing societal concerns require decisions which take into account a distant 
and uncertain future. Recent developments in strategic decision-making suggest that individuals, or 
a small group of individuals, can unilaterally influence the collective outcome of such complex social 
dilemmas. However, these results do not account for the extent to which decisions are moderated 
by uncertainty in the probability or timing of future outcomes that characterise the valuation of a 
(distant) uncertain future. Here we develop a general framework that captures interactions among 
uncertainty, the resulting time-inconsistent discounting, and their consequences for decision-making 
processes. In deterministic limits, existing theories can be recovered. More importantly, new insights 
are obtained into the possibilities for strategic influence when the valuation of the future is uncertain. 
We show that in order to unilaterally promote and sustain cooperation in social dilemmas, decisions 
of generous and extortionate strategies should be adjusted to the level of uncertainty. In particular, 
generous payoff relations cannot be enforced during periods of greater risk (which we term the 
“generosity gap”), unless the strategic enforcer orients their strategy towards a more distant future 
by consistently choosing “selfless” cooperative decisions; likewise, the possibilities for extortion are 
directly limited by the level of uncertainty. Our results have implications for policies that aim to solve 
societal concerns with consequences for a distant future and provides a theoretical starting point for 
investigating how collaborative decision-making can help solve long-standing societal dilemmas.
If individuals choose between rewards that differ only in amount, timing, or certainty, decisions are relatively 
predictable because general principles of choice  apply1. For example, individuals tend to choose higher rewards 
over lower ones, sooner rewards over later ones, and secure rewards over risky ones. Indeed, such decisions make 
sense from both an economic and evolutionary perspective and are observed in both humans and  animals1,2. 
Predicting decisions becomes more challenging when the choice options differ in a combination of these factors. 
For example, it can be difficult to predict how an individual chooses between a small but immediate reward and 
a large but distant one. Although such combinations of different features usually require trade-offs in decision-
making, their salient features can be studied from the perspective of discounting on the basis of the expected time 
(delay discounting) or likelihood of their occurrence (probability discounting)1,3–5. Indeed, these discounting 
methods are positively  correlated4,5.
Game theory provides a unifying framework through which these decision-making processes can be formal-
ised under a variety of complex situations. The defining feature of games is that their outcomes depend on not 
only one’s own decision, but also on the decisions of others. This interdependence inherently causes uncertainty 
in probable outcomes and payoffs. It becomes more challenging in repeated games in which a series of interac-
tions occur over time and individuals need to make strategic decisions that take into account how their past and 
current decisions can influence future payoffs under reciprocal altruism, antagonism, punishment or  reward6–8.
Of particular interest are social dilemmas in which immediate self-interests conflict with long-term collec-
tive interests. In these complex social and economic situations, discounting and reciprocity have been shown to 
interactively influence the level of “selfless” cooperative  decisions9–11. This interaction also serves as a plausible 
explanation for the changing (cooperative) behaviours throughout the life span of  humans12–14.
Understanding if, and how, strategic decisions are affected by delay and probability discounting is becoming 
more and more important because many of today’s most pressing societal concerns, like climate change, require 
current decisions to take into account the consequences for an uncertain distant  future15–17. In these complex 
settings, theoretical models for both delay and probability discounting methods use discount rates that decrease 
over  time2,18–22. These hyperbolic-like functions have indeed proven to be a better fit to empirical discounting 
rates than traditional time-consistent exponential functions that tend to discount the far future too  fast1,21,23.
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Recent developments in the theory of direct reciprocity and strategic behaviour suggest that a single, or 
small group of strategic individuals, can have a much larger influence on other players’ decisions than previously 
 anticipated24,25. In particular, these theories enable strategic individuals to solve social dilemmas by applying 
generous strategies that can unilaterally “enforce” mutual cooperation in a large group of decision-makers25,26. 
However, these theories are built on traditional time-consistent discounting methods, that leave out important 
elements of the psychology of  discounting16. In fact, the current assumptions on discount factors in repeated 
social dilemmas can easily cause discrepancies between theoretical cooperation levels and observed experimental 
 behaviours27,28.
Although these novel theories provide important perspectives for policy-makers when exerting influence in 
long-run collective outcomes, it is not yet known how the intricate strategies hold up under more sophisticated 
discounting methods that take the inherent uncertainty of future outcomes into account. By incorporating 
uncertainty about the discount factor into the framework of repeated games, we generalise the existing theories 
on strategic play and show how individuals can exert a significant level of influence even under time-inconsistent 
discounting. The proposed discounting framework is consistent with the hyperbolic form observed by experi-
mentalists and, in its deterministic limits, complies with existing theories of strategic play. We postulate that 
this theoretical framework is more appropriate for describing real-world decision making procedures in which 
judgements on the number of interactions is made under  uncertainty27 or the far-distant future is crucial for the 
success of current strategic  decisions16.
To show the utility of our results, we consider a general class of n-player social  dilemmas15,16,25. In the model 
individual players repeatedly choose to cooperate or defect. A player’s payoff in a given round depends on their 
decision and the number of cooperating co-players25,30,31. If z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} co-players cooperate, then the 
single-round payoff for cooperation is az , and the single-round payoff for defection is bz . We only assume the 
single-round payoffs satisfy three characteristic properties of social  dilemmas25,32: first, irrespective of one’s own 
decision to cooperate or defect, players prefer their co-players to cooperate; second, in a group of cooperators 
and defectors, defecting players have a strict advantage; finally, the mutual cooperation payoff ( an−1 ) is more 
beneficial than the mutual defection payoff ( b0 ), see  Fig. 1. These characteristics are able to capture a variety of 
complex situations in which payoffs can non-linearly depend on the decisions of one’s co-players and include 
the prisoners dilemma game, the public goods game, the volunteers dilemma, the n-player snowdrift  game31, 
the n-player stag hunt  game33, and many more.
Discounting an uncertain future. In traditional repeated games with finite but undetermined time hori-
zons, the expected number of rounds is determined by a fixed and common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) that, given 
the current round of interactions, determines the probability of a next round, and is therefore also referred to as a 
continuation probability. Consequently, expected discounted payoffs are calculated using a discounting function 
δt that corresponds to deterministic discrete-time exponential  discounting16,34,35. However, if one is uncertain 
about the discount factor or the probability for next  interactions27, then the value of the payoffs relying on future 
interactions are uncertain as well and it is not the case that a fixed parameter δ can be used to represent the dis-
counted value of payoffs.
Under this uncertainty, hyperbolic discounting functions typically refer to relatively short-run decision-
making behaviour under delayed or probabilistic  rewards5,23,36,37. A similar argument can be made for discount-
ing the distant future: strategic decisions with consequences for the distant future are made not knowing the 
relevant outcome and should therefore be discounted  probabilistically21,23. In the spirit of gamma discounting21, 
let us thus assume that discount factors are described by a random variable x, whose probability density function 
f (x,α,β) , defined for all x ∈ [0, 1] , is of the beta form
Figure 1.  Illustration of a social dilemma. Dots represent players: cooperators are indicated by blue dots and 
defectors by red dots. The size of the dot indicates the payoff of the player. A group of cooperators typically 
create a maximum collective benefit. In mixed groups defectors benefit from cooperators and receive larger 
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where B(α,β) is the beta function. Indeed, the beta distribution is often used to describe the distribution of a 
bounded random variable (like an uncertain probability) and is thus a suitable  choice38,39. The obtained effective 
discounting function21 becomes
where Ŵ(·) indicates the gamma function. This effective discounting function indicates how payoffs are dis-
counted when the probability for future interactions and their outcomes are uncertain (Fig. 2).
As one would expect, the payoffs that are received now are not subject to uncertainty and are “discounted” 
by the factor d(0) = 1 . Interestingly, the rate of change of equation (1) is
and thus supports the empirically validated feature of hyperbolic discounting in which the discount rate decreases 
monotonically over  time1, 2 and thereby suitably discounts the distant future with the lowest possible  rate21,23.
To theoretically investigate how this affects strategic decision-making, one can incorporate the effective dis-
count function in equation (1) in a repeated game. Denoting by πi(t) the expected payoff of player i in round t, 
the average discounted payoff of player i can be written as
For β > 1 the series of the effective discounting function in the denominator of equation (3) converges to
indicating that the shape parameters of the beta distribution analytically determine the normalisation factor of 
the average discounted payoff of players. It is worth pointing out that the requirement β > 1 rules out the pos-
sibility for a uniform and u-shaped distribution, indicating that players cannot be “completely” uncertain about 
how to value an uncertain future.
Influencing an uncertain future. A strategic individual is typically interested in maximising their influ-
ence in a decision-making process by employing a decision-making strategy that guarantees a desired relative 
performance. One could, for instance, be interested in outperforming others via extortionate ZD strategies or 
ensuring that others do well via generous ZD  strategies24,25,40. When there is no discounting or future payoffs 
are discounted deterministically, individuals can indeed strategically influence outcomes by employing a fixed 
strategy that enforces a linear payoff relation in the average discounted payoff of their co-players ( π−i ) and their 
own average discounted  payoff24,25,35:
The strategy parameter s is commonly referred to as the slope of the linear payoff relation and determines how π−i 
varies with πi , while the parameter l is referred to as the baseline payoff that determines the average discounted 
payoffs when all players employ the same ZD  strategy25. While a fixed strategy suffices in the deterministic case, 
equation (2) indicates that uncertainty does change discount rates, which have to be taken into account in one’s 
effort to strategically influence uncertain future outcomes. This necessarily requires one’s decision-making strat-
egy to adapt to the changing discount rates and thus become time-varying. In section 2 of the Supplementary 
Information we show how risk-adjusted strategies cope with uncertainty and by doing so, allow a strategic player 
to strategically influence an uncertain future. However, the uncertainties, that are so common in the real-world, 
come with fundamental limitations that previous theories have overlooked.
The generosity gap. Strategies that can enforce generous payoff relations ( 0 < s < 1, l = an−1 ) have 
received significant scientific attention for their ability to unilaterally promote and sustain cooperative behaviour 
via direct  reciprocity7,25,26 and  evolution40,41. We find that such strategies do not exist when the uncertain future 
is discounted using the hyperbolic-like effective discounting function in equation (1) (see Supplementary Infor-
mation section 2 for more details). Due to the time-varying discount rates these strategies become well-defined 
only after a significant amount of time, i.e. the generosity gap (see Fig. 3), has passed:
Equation (6) implies that the more uncertain an “as if ” constant mean discount factor becomes, the longer a 
strategic player is prevented from enforcing a generous payoff relation, unless they simply always cooperate (see 
Supplementary Information section 2 for details). After the generosity gap has passed, the effective discounting 
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Figure 2.  Discounting uncertain future outcomes. Strategic decisions in social dilemmas are affected by the valuation of 
probabilistic long-run outcomes that result from collective behaviour and the probability for continued interaction. Different 
outcomes, indicated by the partially filled coloured circles in panel (a), can be valued with different discount factors depending 
on expected time and likelihood of occurrence. Theoretically these psychological and economic complexities in decision-
making can be modelled by an uncertain discount factor shown in panel (b). This results in the hyperbolic-like effective 
discounting function shown in panel (c) and equation (1). In the illustration the shape parameters of the beta distribution in 
panel (b) are α = 5 and β = 5
4
 , leading to a mean discount factor of 0.8 and a variance of approximately 0.022.
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the averaged payoffs received beyond the generosity gap that are discounted with a relatively constant and low 
discount rate. This indicates that under uncertainty a generous strategic player can only solve social dilemmas by 
completely setting aside their immediate and short-term interests and adjust their strategic influence to a notably 
far-distant future. Interestingly, if the discount factor becomes certain, the deterministic limits of equation (1) 
are consistent with existing theories in which generous payoff relations can be enforced without any generosity 
gap (see the Supplementary Information section 2 for more details).
Extortion in an uncertain future. When future interactions are at least as likely as a termination of the 
game, the beta distribution is symmetric or negatively skewed ( α ≥ β ) and strategic decisions tend to include 
at least one future interaction. In the Supplementary information (section  2) we show that for many social 
dilemmas, in fact, this is a requirement for the possibility to strategically influence an uncertain future with an 
extortionate payoff relation ( 0 < s < 1, l = b0 ) that can promote cooperation and typically ensures a beneficial 
relative performance of the strategic player. For any positively skewed distribution the low mean discount factor 
does not allow strategic influence because payoffs are discounted too fast and others cannot “learn” to cooperate 
with the  extortioner7,26. This additional requirement also provides insight into how uncertain the discount factor 
or continuation probability can be before losing the possibility to enforce a desired extortionate payoff relation. 
For symmetric or negatively skewed distributions the theoretical maximum variance that a strategic player can 
deal with while exerting an extortionate payoff relation occurs when α = β , and evaluates as
Now let us suppose the strategic player has estimated the distribution of the discount  factor21. Then, exactly 
how extortionate can a payoff relation be? In general, this depends on the one-shot payoffs and the mean of the 
beta distribution given by µ = α
α+β
 . Figure 4 illustrates this for the linear public goods game and the n-player 
snowdrift  game31. In both games, an increased mean discount factor slows down discounting and enables more 
extortionate influence (see Supplementary Information section 2 for a general characterisation). However, as 
with generosity there is a catch: an increased mean discount factor comes at the price of a decreased maximum 
allowable variance as determined by equation (7). Thus, when discounting becomes slower and the distant future 
becomes more relevant for today’s decisions, an extortioner is required to be more certain about the valuation 
of events further in the future.
Discussion
Classic theories of strategic decision-making rely on how one’s actions can affect their future. If one would 
consider to defect by choosing selfishly at some point in time, how large will the consequences of retaliation be? 
And is the fear of retaliation from others enough to sustain cooperation even when the immediate benefit of 
defection is large? These strategic trade-offs are commonly referred to as “the shadow of the future” and provide 
an elegant theoretical explanation for the emergence of cooperative behaviour of rational players in repeated 
social  dilemmas8. However, even with moderate discount factors, the exponential discounting functions used in 
these theories attribute meaningless significance to the distant  future23 and do not take into account empirically 








Figure 3.  The generosity gap. Numerical example of the conditional probability for the strategic player to 
mutually cooperate with their co-players for a variable shape parameter α , a fixed mean discount factor µ = 0.8 , 
and β = α(1−µ)
µ
 . When the variance in the discount factor increases (for lower α values) it takes longer for the 
generous risk-adjusted strategy to become well-defined. Consequently, the generosity gap, that indicates the 
time the strategic player cannot enforce a generous payoff relation, increases in length.
6
Vol:.(1234567890)
Scientific RepoRtS |        (2020) 10:12169  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-69006-x
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
distant future. More recently, strategic behaviour has been studied from an alternative perspective by identifying 
decision-making strategies that can unilaterally exert strategic influence on the long-run collective behaviour. 
Because they require minimal assumptions on the behaviour of others, such strategies are of particularly interest 
to human decision-making7. However, also these theories are built upon valuations of future scenarios that, in 
reality, are riddled with uncertainties in the probability or timing of payoffs that are likely to influence strategic 
 decisions27,42.
Here we have modelled these uncertainties with a discounting method that exhibits the characteristic fea-
tures of empirically validated delay, probability and social discounting  methods1,5. Using the proposed frame-
work, existing theories of strategic decision-making can be recovered in deterministic limits and new insights 
are obtained into the interaction between uncertainty, discounting and the possibilities for strategic influence. 
Namely, in social dilemmas, uncertainty leads to generosity gaps that require generous strategic influence to be 
adjusted to the longer term. These potentially long periods of time in which no generous payoff relation can be 
enforced may also contribute to the empirically observed inconsistencies in strategic influence and cooperation 
levels over  time25,26. On the other hand, our results indicate that the slower discounting becomes, the more cer-
tain an extortioner needs to be about an increasingly distant future: sufficient patience thus requires sufficient 
certainty. These findings illustrate the difficulties one can expect when attempting to exert strategic influence 
in the real world and provide new insights for decision-making experiments in more controlled environments. 
From a more technical point of view, our extension to time-varying strategies that is found in the Supplementary 
Information section 2, provides a novel perspective for the study of reciprocity in changing  environments43.
In this paper, we interpreted the beta distribution as a common uncertain belief in the discount factor or 
continuation probability which is a rather restricting assumption. However, we believe arguments can be made 
for interpreting the beta distribution as an approximation of the distribution of discount factors in a large group 
of  individuals21,44. In this case, (1) can be seen as a weighted average discounting function used in collaborative 
decisions45,46. In this context, our framework can be used to theoretically study the strategic behaviour of groups 
making collective decisions and how the group composition can affect their cooperative behaviour.
Regardless of the interpretation, our work shows that strategic efforts to solve social dilemmas must be 
adjusted to the uncertainty in the valuation of the future, because only then can strategic influence help to solve 
today’s societal concerns.
Received: 16 March 2020; Accepted: 16 June 2020
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